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An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal
stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account
when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner’s dilemma
game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by
its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly
severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced
activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions
for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines
how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay
rate, at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity
patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-
degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The
sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so
does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of
such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when
the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of statistical physics to problems in evo-
lutionary game theory has proven rewarding and conducive
to inspiring results with a broad range of applicability [1–8].
The successful evolution of cooperation in the realm of social
dilemmas — when what is best for an individual is at odds
with what is best for the society — is a subject that bene-
fited particularly from this development, with innovative re-
search revealing key mechanisms that can either promote or
hinder the evolution of socially preferable states [9–22]. More
specifically, it has been shown that phase transitions towards
cooperative states depend on the properties of the interaction
network and the strength of ties, as well as on the number and
type of competing strategies [23–28].
The study of evolutionary dynamics and social dilemmas
using methods borrowed from the physical sciences has been
to a large degree motivated by the seminal work of Nowak
and May [29], who showed that spatial structure might pro-
mote the evolution of cooperation through a mechanism that
is referred to as network reciprocity [30]. During the last
decade, independent research from different groups demon-
strated the importance of heterogeneity of agents for the suc-
cessful evolution of cooperation, be it introduced in the form
of heterogeneous interaction networks – note, however, that
for the case of human interactions, it is not clear whether net-
work reciprocity plays a key role [31, 32] – noisy disturbances
∗Electronic address: albertoaleta@gmail.com
to payoffs, or other player-specific properties like the teach-
ing activity or the propensity to acquire new links over time
[23, 33–48]. Evidently, the consideration of various sources
of heterogeneity is crucial to the subject, especially concern-
ing the subject of human cooperation [28, 49, 50], since our
societies are not made up of uniform individuals. On the con-
trary, inequalities in wealth, reputation, the number of friends,
and many other measurables characterizing real life, abound.
Motivated by the above considerations, we study the evo-
lution of cooperation in social dilemmas, where players differ
in their activity. More precisely, we no longer assume that
players always participate in each round of the game [51],
but rather, that their participation is probabilistic, with the
probability depending on either their degree in the network
or their current payoff. We thus obtain a setting with degree-
correlated or payoff-correlated activity patterns, depending on
which criterion is used. Importantly, inactive players, i.e.,
players that do not participate in a particular instance of the
game, get a null payoff and are unable to replicate. In this
sense, our consideration of inactivity is different from the con-
sideration of loners [52], who can replicate, and who refuse to
participate by default in exchange for a small but fixed in-
come. The treatment of inactivity as a dynamically changing
state of players rather than a strategy, reveals the fascinating
complexity evoked by different activity patterns of players. As
we will show, while degree-correlated activity introduces cas-
cading failures of cooperation that can only be compensated
by a tedious spatiotemporal reorganization of compact coop-
erative clusters, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nu-
anced activity profile that hinders systemic breakdowns of co-
operation and provides optimal conditions for cooperators to
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2survive if the exponential decay to baseline activity is appro-
priately adjusted.
The continuation of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we first present the details of the studied mathemat-
ical model, while in Section III we presented the main results
of our research. We conclude in Section IV with a discussion
of the broader implications of our conclusions.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We use the simplified version of the prisoner’s dilemma
game, where the key aspects of the social dilemma are pre-
served but its strength is determined by a single parame-
ter [29]. In particular, mutual cooperation yields the reward
R = 1, mutual defection leads to punishment P = 0, and the
mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S = 0
and the defector the temptation T > 1. We note that the se-
lection of this widely used and representative parametrization
gives results that remain valid in a broad range of pairwise
social dilemmas, including the snowdrift and the stag-hunt
game.
At this point, we note that the consideration of different ac-
tivity patterns does not affect the expected outcome of social
dilemmas in well-mixed populations, so that we thus focus
on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations. As
the interaction network, we use scale-free networks generated
according to the uncorrelated configuration model [53], each
with an average degree k = 4.5 and size N = 104. Cooper-
ators (C) and defectors (D) are initially distributed uniformly
at random, so that they have equal chances for success during
the evolution.
Simulations are performed in agreement with a syn-
chronous updating protocol, such that each player i plays the
game with all its ki neighbors and thereby collects the pay-
off Πi. Once all the players collected their payoffs an evolu-
tionary step takes place. For the evolution of strategies, we
employ the replicator dynamics, such that if Πj > Πi, player
j will replicate its strategy sj to the site of player i with the
probability
Psj→si =
Πj −Πi
max(kj , ki)b
. (1)
We perform simulations until the average fraction of coopera-
tors in the population 〈c〉 reaches its long time pattern −note
that it could be an oscillatory or a steady state.
To introduce different activity patterns, we assign to ev-
ery player an activation probability Pai ∈ [0, 1] according to
which player i participates in a particular round of the game.
Accordingly, with probability 1−Pai the player i remains in-
active in each round of the game. If a player i is active, it will
play the game with all its ki neighbors, independently from
whether they are active or not, and it will obtain the payoff Πi
as dictated by all the strategy pairs. If a player i is inactive, it
will not play any games with its neighbors, and accordingly,
its payoff Πi will be null. Furthermore, only active players
are able to pass their strategy in agreement with the replicator
equation, while inactive players are never able to replicate be-
cause their payoff is always zero (and hence never larger than
the payoff of the neighbor).
Since the introduction of probabilistic participation of play-
ers in each instance of the game introduces a degree of het-
erogeneity to the evolutionary time scales and adds a layer
of stochasticity to the spatiotemporal dynamics, it affects the
correlation scales and can induce cascading effects that disrupt
the formation of cooperative clusters. The distribution of acti-
vation probabilities in the population therefore plays a crucial
role. Accordingly, we consider separately degree-correlated
activity such that Pai = ki/kmax where kmax is the largest
degree in the network [54], as well as payoff-correlated activ-
ity, such that
Pai(t) = Pai(t− 1) +
1
α
f(Pai , pii)
pii(t− 1)− 〈pii〉(t−2,...,t−ki)
bki
−∆Paie−τ(1−|∆Pai |) (2)
where ∆Pai = Pai(t − 1) − Pai(0), Pai(0) = ki/kmax, and
〈pii〉(t−2,...,t−ki) represents the weighted mean of the payoff
obtained by node i over the last ki time steps with weights
given by wj = (ki − j)/ki. Lastly, f(Pai , pii) is equal to
f(Pai , pii) =
 1− Pai(t− 1) if pii(t− 1) > 〈pii〉(t−2,...,t−ki)Pai(t− 1) if pii(t− 1) < 〈pii〉(t−2,...,t−ki)0 otherwise (3)
The last term of Eq. (2) depends only on the difference be- tween the current activation probability and the initial activa-
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FIG. 1: Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators, as obtained for different values of b (see legend) and with different activity rules. Results
obtained with degree-correlated activity are depicted in the top left panel (a), while results obtained with payoff-correlated activity with τ = 1,
4 and 8 are depicted in the top right and bottom two panels, (b), (c) and (d), respectively. It can be observed, particularly for b = 2.1, that the
sharp drops in cooperation vanish when going from degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity with increasingly large values of τ . At the
same time, however, the plateau level of the fraction of cooperators drops as well too.
tion probability at time t = 0. Thus, the bigger the difference
between the current and the initial activation probability, and
the larger the value of τ , the faster the activity of a player
will return to its original state. The second term of of Eq. (2)
represents the variation that is due to the payoff obtained by
each player. We first compute the average payoff obtained by
each player over the last ki time steps so that a player has the
longer memory the higher its degree. To increase the impor-
tance of the last rounds of the game we weight the average
wj = (ki − j)/ki with
〈pii(t)〉(t−1,...,t−ki) =
ki−1∑
j=0
wjpii(t− 1− j)
ki−1∑
j=0
wj
(4)
and then compute the difference between the payoff obtained
in the last round and this average, and finally normalize it with
the factor bki. In the limit where 〈pii〉 → 0 and pii(t − 1) →
bki this fraction would take the value of 1. The function
f(Pai , pii), given by Eq. (3), which multiplies the second term
in Eq. (2), represents the difference between the current acti-
vation probability and its upper limit if the payoff increases
and between the current activation probability and its lower
limit if the payoff decreases. Thus, in the limit where the pre-
vious fraction takes the value of 1 this term will try to set the
activation probability to 1, whereas if it takes a value of −1
this term will try to set it to 0. As the described change can
be quite abrupt, we include a parameter α to modulate this
behavior. In the following, we will consider α = τ without
loss of generality, thus leaving us with τ as the key parame-
ter determining the interplay between the linear term and the
exponential term in Eq. (2) when considering payoff-driven
activity of players.
We note that this mechanism is similar to the Pavlov strat-
egy (also known as win-stay-lose-shift [55–58]), but adapted
to the activation probability. Indeed, a player will tend to keep
playing as long as it is winning, but will diminish his activity
if it loses. This provides a game-exit option that was not in-
cluded in previous models [54].
III. RESULTS
Based on the consideration of limiting cases entering
Eqs. (2-4) and the shape of the resulting Pai(t) function, the
most interesting interval to explore in terms of the exponen-
tial decay that determines how fast the activity of a player
returns to its default state is 1 <∼ τ <∼ 10. We thus begin by
showing representative time courses of the fraction of coop-
erators c, as obtained for different values of the temptation to
defect b, and for different activity rules, in Fig. 1. For degree-
correlated activity, and since the game is staged on a scale-
free network, the cascading failures of cooperation, which are
due to frequently inactive hubs, are clearly observable, espe-
cially for b = 2.1. On Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, on the other
hand, the activity pattern does not induce sudden drops of the
fraction of cooperators due to the lack of hubs, and thus coop-
erators rely predominantly on traditional network reciprocity
[54]. Also, it can be observed that the level of cooperation on
a scale-free network requires a comparatively long time to re-
cover from the sudden drops, which is due to the fact that the
spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters
requires time. Interestingly, not all values of b expose this fea-
ture equally well, which has to do with the fact that scale-free
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FIG. 2: Cooperation probability in dependence on the degree of players, as obtained for different values of b (see legend) and with different
activity rules. Results obtained with degree-correlated activity are depicted in the top left panel (a), while results obtained with payoff-
correlated activity with τ = 1, 4 and 8 are depicted in the top right and bottom two panels, (b), (c) and (d), respectively. The shift towards
more cooperative hubs and more cooperative average-degree players is evident when going from degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity,
especially for τ = 4 and b > 2.
networks are very potent amplifiers of cooperation [54]. Ac-
cordingly, it is only when the cooperation level starts to drop
significantly in the population do the cascading failures be-
come most pronounced. As b is increased further, the overall
level of cooperation becomes so low that again the cascading
failures are less visible. For the sake of the clarity of our ar-
guments, we thus focus on those values of b that convey the
crucial point most clearly.
For payoff-correlated activity with τ = 1 the evolution-
ary outcome is much the same as for degree-correlated ac-
tivity, with common sharp drops in the level of cooperation,
and relatively long recovery periods being clearly visible for
b = 2.0 and 2.1 (see upper right panel in Fig. 1). However, for
τ = 4 and τ = 8 the sudden drops in the level of cooperation
progressively vanish, and overall, the time courses become
smoother. A qualitative change in the evolutionary dynamics
when going to degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity
of players is thus observable. By comparing results obtained
with τ = 4 and τ = 8 more closely, one can also infer that,
in addition to the drops vanishing, the plateau values of the
fraction of cooperators c also become lower for the larger τ
value. Accordingly, it is not immediately clear whether the
absence of drops offsets the drops in the plateau values, and
thus, whether payoff-correlated activity has any evolutionary
advantages to degree-correlated activity.
To shed light on the details behind the results presented in
Fig. 1, we show in Fig. 2 the cooperation probability in depen-
dence on the degree of players forming the scale-free network.
While for b < 2 the probability profiles differ insignificantly
across the panels, for b = 2.4 the shift towards more coopera-
tive hubs and more cooperative average-degree players is ev-
ident when going from degree-correlated to payoff-correlated
activity with τ = 1, 4 and 8. However, while for τ = 1 and
τ = 4 low degree nodes still maintain a relatively high coop-
eration probability too, for τ = 8 the same probability tappers
off significantly faster. Accordingly, as τ increases hubs and
average-degree nodes increase their chances of retaining a co-
operative state, but low-degree nodes see their chances for co-
operation diminished. A clear tradeoff thus appears to emerge
between keeping the hubs and average-degree nodes cooper-
ating, while at the same time not loosing low-degree nodes to
defection. In this sense one can already envisage an optimal
value of τ that should work best for the resolution of severe
social dilemmas.
Before making these argument quantitatively more precise,
it is also instructive to examine representative snapshots of the
network, as shown in Fig. 3, where players are color-coded
in agreement with their cooperation probabilities. Also, the
size of each player corresponds to its degree in the network
(log-scale). The color code is such that red is used for de-
fectors (Pc ∼ 0), blue for players with intermediate coop-
eration probability (Pc ∼ 0.5), green for very likely coop-
erators (Pc <∼ 0.9), and yellow for virtually pure coopera-
tors (Pc > 0.9). It can be observed at a glance that for
payoff-correlated activity with τ = 4 (lower panel) the hubs
and average-degree nodes are predominantly yellow, while for
degree-correlated activity the hubs are green at best. There is
also lots of red color, i.e., defectors, on the periphery of both
depicted giant components, yet in neither cases this extends
significantly to larger nodes, i.e., players with a larger degree
within the network. The depicted two snapshots thus confirm
that an appropriately set value of τ can effectively increase
the probability for hubs and average-degree nodes to main-
tain a cooperative state, while at the same time not negatively
affecting the cooperation probability for lower-degree nodes.
As observed in Fig. 2, the latter does not necessarily hold if
5P(c)
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FIG. 3: Snapshot of the giant component of the network, as obtained
using degree-correlated (top) and payoff-correlated (bottom) activity
at b = 2.4 and τ = 4. The size of the players is proportional to
their degree in the complete network, and their color is proportional
to their cooperation probability as follows: red for defective nodes
(Pc ∼ 0), blue for nodes with intermediate cooperation probability
(Pc ∼ 0.5), green for highly cooperating nodes (Pc <∼ 0.9), and
yellow for almost pure cooperators (Pc > 0.9). Evidently, yellow
color is more common among high-degree and average-degree nodes
in the bottom network, where payoff-correlated activity is applied.
the value of τ increases, as then low-degree players in the net-
work see their cooperation probability significantly lowered.
Results presented in Fig. 4 make our arguments made so far
quantitative, showing in the main panel how the average frac-
tion of cooperators in the network 〈c〉 varies in dependence
on the temptation to defect b for the traditional case with uni-
form activity (Traditional) and different activity patterns. It
can be observed that, especially for b > 2, where, as we have
explained above the effects of different activity patterns are
most clearly visible in Fig. 1, the payoff-correlated activity
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FIG. 4: Average fraction of cooperators in dependence on the temp-
tation to defect b, as obtained for the traditional version of the game
with a uniform activity profile (TD), with degree-correlated activity
(degree), and with payoff-correlated activity (τ = 1, 4, 8). The inset
shows the normalized difference of the average fraction of cooper-
ators (see main text for details) in dependence on the exponential
decay rate to baseline activity τ . Both results in the main panel and
the inset show that there exists an optimal value of τ at which, partic-
ularly for b > 2 the level of cooperation in the population is highest.
with τ = 4 delivers consistently best results in comparison
to all the other depicted cases. At the extreme end of the
spectrum in terms of the severity of the social dilemma, for
b = 3, cooperators die out in the traditional case and main-
tain a 10% existence for degree-correlated activity, while for
payoff-correlated activity with τ = 4 up to 20% of the pop-
ulation is cooperating. Moreover, the inset in Fig. 4 shows
σc(τ, 1) =
〈c(τ)〉−〈c(1)〉
〈c(1)〉 in dependence on τ for different val-
ues of b to emphasize the existence of an optimal speed of
the exponential decay to baseline activity of players under
the payoff-driven rule. In particular, while the optimum for
b = 1.5 is absent, for b = 2.0 is becomes faintly inferrable,
and for b = 2.4 and 3.0 it is very clear, with the optimal value
of τ being 4 and 5, respectively. This thus confirms the exis-
tence of the tradeoff between keeping the hubs and average-
degree nodes cooperating, while at the same time not loosing
low-degree nodes to defection, which combined for an op-
timal value of τ can lead to an optimal resolution of social
dilemmas.
As results presented in Fig. 5 show, this tradeoff is directly
reflected in the activation probabilities of players when plot-
ted against their degrees in the network. While the degree-
correlated activity in the form Pai = ki/kmax where kmax of
course linearly interpolates between the player with the lowest
and the highest degree, payoff-correlated activity increasingly
deviates from this linear profile as τ increases in an S-shaped
manner. Thus, both hubs and low-degree players become less
active on the expense of average-degree hubs, which in turn
see their activation probability increased. This transitions is
the more pronounced the higher the value of the temptation to
defect b, which also explains why the effects of the optimal
value of τ are more pronounced at larger values of b. Nev-
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FIG. 5: Activation probability in dependence on the degree of players, as obtained for different values of b (see legend) and with different
activity rules. Results obtained with degree-correlated activity are depicted in the top left panel (a), while results obtained with payoff-
correlated activity with τ = 1, 4 and 8 are depicted in the top right and bottom two panels, (b), (c) and (d), respectively. The shift from a linear
interpolation of activity for the degree-correlated case to an S-shaped distribution as τ increases is clearly visible, especially for b > 2. Note
that for the degree-correlated case Pai = ki/kmax, and thus P (a) is independent of b.
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FIG. 6: Cooperation probability in dependence on the activation probability for each player using payoff-correlated activity with different
values of τ and two different values of the temptation to defect b [(a) τ = 1, b = 2.4; (b) τ = 4, b = 2.4; (c) τ = 8, b = 2.4; (d) τ = 1,
b = 3.0; (e) τ = 4, b = 3.0; (f) τ = 8, b = 3.0]. In addition, the degree of each player is color coded with the color bar on the right. For
details regarding the interpretation of these results were refer to the main text.
ertheless, the fact that hubs would be able to better maintain
their cooperative state despite being active less of the time is
contradictory, and opposes the argument we put forward for
degree-correlated activity – namely that it induces cascading
failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-
free networks due to frequently inactive hubs. But looking at
hubs alone as the backbone of cooperation is misleading. As
recently emphasized by Morone and Makse [59], and shown
explicitly for the evolution of cooperation in [60], not just the
degree matters for the players to have a strong influence on the
population, but also their neighborhoods. So even average-
degree and low-degree players can be optimal influencers if
they are surrounded by a hierarchy of high-degree hubs. As
can be inferred from the networks depicted in Fig.3, and as
is in general well-known, hubs in a scale-free network tend
to be hierarchically linked, so that the hubs, which are also
the oldest nodes, are preferentially linked with nodes of simi-
lar degree (and age). Thus, by supporting a healthy activity of
7average-degree players can be advantageous for the successful
evolution of cooperation, even if it means the highest-degree
nodes having a slightly lower activity in return, because the
higher probability of cooperation of average-degree players
helps the hubs to maintain cooperation too. In this argument,
there is of course also an optimal tradeoff between just how
much activity of high-degree nodes should be sacrificed for
the higher activity of average-degree nodes, which in our case
turns out to be warranted by τ = 4 in Eq. (2), and which as
shown in the inset of Fig. 4, ensures the highest level of coop-
eration at sufficiently large values of b.
As the final result to corroborate our arguments, we show
in Fig. 6 how the cooperation probability depends on the ac-
tivation probability for two different values of b, for both of
which the optimal value of τ is clearly inferable in Fig. 4. For
clarity, the degree of players with the corresponding values is
also color coded via the color bar on the right of the figure.
First, it can be observed that for b = 3.0 (bottom three pan-
els), the overall P (c) values are lower than for b = 2.4, which
is expected because the higher severity of the social dilemma.
Comparing the panels from left to right in both rows, however,
shows quite clearly that for τ = 4 (middle), the activity prob-
ability of average-degree hubs is higher than for τ = 1, and
these players also have a higher probability of cooperation. At
the same time, hubs loose some of their activation, but their
probability to cooperate goes up as well, which as we have
argued, is driven by the revived status of the average-degree
players. As τ = 8 the fast decay to baseline activity imposes a
sharp barrier, which is particularly visible for b = 3.0, which
prevents the activity pattern to have a noticeable impact on the
evolutionary outcome, effectively returning a result similar to
the traditional version of the game where each player has a
uniform activity.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the impact of different activity patterns on
the evolution of cooperation in the weak prisoner’s dilemma
game on scale-free networks. Through the introduction of dif-
ferent individual activation probabilities, we have considered
degree-correlated and payoff-correlated activity patterns, with
the later also having a tunable exponential decays to baseline
activity. In both cases, we have assumed that active players
play the game with their neighbors and obtain their payoffs
accordingly, while inactive players do not play and thus end
up with a null payoff. In agreement with this, only active play-
ers were able to pass their strategies to their neighbors, while
inactive players were unable to do likewise. Within this setup,
we have shown that degree-correlated activity introduces cas-
cading failures of cooperation that are due to frequently in-
active hubs. This in turn invokes the need for the spatiotem-
poral reorganization of compact cooperative clusters, which
takes comparatively long, thus resulting in an overall lower
cooperation level. Conversely, for payoff-correlated activity
with an intermediately fast decay to baseline activity, we have
demonstrated the existence of optimal conditions for the reso-
lution of social dilemmas. In particular, we have shown that in
this case the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by
the increased activity of average-degree players. The sudden
drops in the level of cooperation therefore no longer occur,
and an overall higher level of cooperation in the population is
attained.
We have further corroborated our main conclusions with
the study of the average activity of players in dependence
on their degree, showing that under the optimal conditions
both the hubs and the low-degree players have a compara-
tively lower activity than under degree-correlated activity rule,
while at the same time average-degree nodes have an elevated
activity. There is transition from a linear activity profiles to
and S-shaped activity profile in dependence on the degree.
In this sense, the optimal result is on first glance contradic-
tory, since, as is well known, cooperative hubs act as impor-
tant centers of sizable and compact communities of cooper-
ators on scale-free networks [23]. It would thus seem pro-
hibitive that an even lower level of activity would improve
the chances of success for cooperation. As it turns out, since
the average-degree nodes are more active, and since they are
predominantly linked directly to the hubs, their increased ac-
tivity acts as a protector against a strategy change towards de-
fection. Here the concept of collective influence, as recently
introduced by Morone and Makse [59], becomes crucial, in
that a more wholesome take on the problem that goes beyond
an individual’s degree and hub status is needed. In a nut-
shell, many average-degree, and even low-degree, nodes can
be optimal influencers if they are “surrounded by hierarchi-
cal coronas of hubs”. Thus, by supporting a healthy activity
of average-degree players, even if it is on the expense of the
hubs, ultimately turns out to be advantageous for sustenance
of cooperation. Notably, a similar argument was recently in-
troduced in [60] to explain the optimal distribution of the po-
tency of players for passing their strategies in a network.
We conclude by noting that even the relatively simple con-
siderations of different activity patterns in evolutionary games
reveal remarkable complexity in the underlying dynamics, in-
volving cascading failures that present itself as asymmetric
dynamic instabilities in the time course of the evolution of
the two competing strategies under degree-correlated activity,
and the progressive annihilation thereof under appropriately
fine-tuned payoff-correlated activity. Although properly tak-
ing into account the diversity of individual activities of players
[61, 62] is certainly an important aspect of bringing models
closer to real-life conditions, it nevertheless seems a daunt-
ing proposition to add to the complexity of the studied model.
In the future, it would be interesting to see experiments on
human cooperation with an exit strategy, as studied before
experimentally in the ultimatum game [63], while modeling
and simulation efforts could be directed towards relative times
scales in evolutionary dynamics [64], in that the typical time
for an activation change is likely to be different from the time
needed to make a strategy change. We hope that this paper
will motivate further research along this line in the near fu-
ture, as well as to draw attention to the importance of collec-
tive influence in networks for the evolution of cooperation in
particular, and for social phenomena, ranging from efficient
immunization to the diffusion of information in general.
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